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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 20010219-CA 
v. : 
STEPHEN LAMAR GEUKGEUZIAN, : 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINTS ON REHEARING 
1. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's invited error argument because, 
although defendant submitted an instruction containing the very error he complains of on appeal, 
he did not, as in State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, % 53,989 P.2d 1091, also object to a correct 
instruction. The additional requirement is unnecessary under Utah law, as demonstrated by 
the decisions cited by the Court. 
2. In reaching the merits of defendant's instructional challenge, the Court of Appeals 
states that the witness tampering statute "specifies no mens rea for the attempt or inducement 
element..." State v. Geakgenzian, 2002 UT App 130, |^ 8. However, a defendant may be 
found guilty under the statute only if he acts "believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508( 1) (Supp. 2001). This prov lsion 
satisfies the mens rea requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTION BASED ON INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR WHERE HE 
PROPOSED A JURY INSTRUCTION CONTAINING THE SAME 
ERROR, EVEN IF HE DID NOT OBJECT TO A CORRECT 
INSTRUCTION 
Defendant challenged the trial court's elements instruction for the crime of witness 
tampering on the ground that by tracking the witness tampering statute it failed to specify a 
mens rea for the crime. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130, % 7. However, defendant's proposed 
instruction was identical to the court's instruction in this regard. Id. atf 10. The State relied 
on this fact to argue that any error was invited, citing State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, *[ 
54,989P.2d 1091, State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT 30, U 22,975 P.2d 469, and State v. Perdue, 813 
P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991). Br. Aple. at 11. 
This Court rejected the State's invited error argument on the ground that, unlike defendant 
here, Chaney had "objected to and rejected the trial court's correct jury instruction." 
Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130, f 10. In other words, this Court held that proposing the same 
jury instruction one challenges on appeal is alone insufficient to trigger the invited error doctrine. 
This is incorrect. Perdue, a decision cited by the State and by this Court in its opinion, 
states, "We conclude that where an instruction is submitted by a party, that same party cannot 
later object to it because he or she has already waived any objection and endorsed it as legally 
sound." 813P.2dat 1205. Similarly, State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), another 
decision cited by the Court in its opinion, held that a defendant "cannot lead the court into 
error by failing to object and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his 
actions." 929 P.2d at 1109 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also State 
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1023 (Utah 1987) (limiting rule 19(c)'s manifest error exception 
to "situations where counsel for the party complaining on appeal merely remained silent at 
trial"). 
Any error in the elements instruction for tampering with a witness was invited and so 
cannot serve as a basis for reversal. 
POINT II 
IN RULING THAT THE WITNESS TAMPERING STATUTE 
LACKS A MENS REA ELEMENT, THIS COURT OVERLOOKED 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT DEFENDANT ACT 
' BELIEVING THAT AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING OR 
INVESTIGATION IS PENDING OR ABOUT TO BE INSTITUTED" 
In reaching the merits of defendant's instructional challenge, the Court of Appeals states 
that the witness tampering statute "specifies no mens rea for the attempt or inducement element 
..." State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130, f 8. Because the court's jury instruction tracked 
the statute, including this omission, this Court reversed defendant's conviction for witness 
tampering. Id. 
In fact, the statute—and thus the instruction—does contain a mens rea requirement. 
A defendant may be found guilty under the statute only if he acts "believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508( 1) 
(Supp. 2001). Cf State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979). This provision satisfies 
the mens rea requirement.1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1999) provides that no person is guilty of an offense unless 
his conduct is prohibited by law and either his act constitutes an offense involving strict liability 
or "[hje acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental 
state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the offense 
requires . . . " (emphasis added). 
As noted above, the witness tampering statute, in defining the offense, specifies that 
a person act believing that an official proceeding is pending or imminent. It thus specifies 
either a "knowing" mental state, or a mental state other than intentional, knowing, reckless, 
or negligent. In either case, the statute—and thus the jury instruction—lacks nothing. No 
1
 The State acknowledges that it failed to assert this argument in its brief, which states, 
'The definition of witness tampering contains no reference to the mental state in which the 
accused must attempt to induce a person to perform any of the enumerated acts." Br. Aple. 
at 10. This sentence could be seen as inviting the very error challenged on rehearing, an 
irony not lost on the State. However, after giving telephone notice to opposing counsel, the 
State did assert this argument in oral argument. Moreover, the opinion in this case is 
published and should reflect a correct reading of the law. 
4 
additional mens rea requirement need be grafted on pursuant to the catchall statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-102(1999). 
Therefore, not only was the error defendant claims on appeal invited by him, but it was 
not error. Trial counsel was correct in proposing, and the trial court in giving, an instruction 
tracking the statutory elements of the crime of witness tampering. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for witness tampering should be affirmed on the ground that 
the elements instruction was correct and, in any event, defendant invited any error. 
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OPINION 
JACKSON,, Presiding Judges 
*1 H 1 Defendant appeals his convictions for 
Tampering with witness, a third degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1) (Supp.2001), and 
making a Written false statement, a class B 
misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504(2) 
(1999). He argues the trial court failed to properly 
instruct the jury on the elements of both offenses. 
Further, he contends that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel We affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
1 2 "We vie* 'v^ ^ • • - he light most favorable to 
the jury verdict an. •-,*. : vm accordingly*" Snin _i 
Loose, 2000 LT * . _•_.«__; ^ ;... " 
*• Defendant supervised Airma- • 
Copr. © West 2002 No Clai 
Pase I 
often overheard Defendant i: naking tl ireats ot 
violence against Defendant's wife when he and 
Defendant were driving together in a vehicle or 
working together in a "small area." [FN 1 ] On May 5. 
2000, Lyon signed a sworn statement regarding the 
threats he had overheard. After she learned of 
Defendant's threats, Defendant's ex-wife Tatilia 
Geukgeuzian, filed a petition for a protective order 
FN1. Because he was in close proximity to 
Defendant during these conversations and 
participated in them, Lyon testified at trial 
that in his view Defendant must have been 
aware that 1, yon, had heard Defendant's 
threats. 
1[ 4 Defendant then took Lyon into a back room and 
requested that he make a statement "Tor his court 
case" suggesting that Lyon had never overheard 
Defendant threaten his ex-wife. Lyon complied with 
Defendant's request. A short time later, Defendant 
presented Lyon with a similar typed statement that 
Defendant had written for Lyon to sign. Lyon signed 
that statement also. At trial, Lyon testified, in effect, 
that he signed these two statements because he felt 
intimidated by Defendant, and because Defendant 
was his supervisor and could punish him at A ork. 
• ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1" 5 Defendant presents three challenges to the jury 
instructions. Because Defendant failed to object to 
the challenged jury instructions at trial, we review 
those instructions only upon a showing of manifest 
injustice. See Utah R.Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Casew 
2001 UT ADD 205.1 26. 29 P.3d 25. "Manifest 
injustice under Rule 19(c) [of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure] ... is determined using the plain 
error standard." State v. Invin. 924 P.2d 5, 10 n. 5 
(Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
To demonstrate plain error, defendant must 
establish the following: "(i) An error exists: (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (in) the error is harmful...." In order to show 
that the error is harmful, defendant must 
demonstrate that "absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant. 
State v. Medina-j itarez, 1 • . , _^ ' S- U P 3d 
187 (citation omitted). 
\ , * "^es his conviction on the 
to Ong. :_ S Gov \ ..•>.-
2002 WL 725651 
2002UTApp 130 
(Cite as: 2002 WL 725651 (Utah App.)) 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim we apply the two-part test of Strickland v 
\Vashin2t0n. 466 U.S. 668. 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 
S.Ct. 2052 (1984). To satisfy that test, the 
defendant must show: "(1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and 
(2) counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." If a defendant fails to establish either 
of the two parts of the Strickland test, counsel's 
assistance was constitutionally sufficient, and we 
need not address the other part of the test. 
*2 Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79 at 1 14 (citation 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Jury Instructions 
f 7 Defendant argues the trial court improperly 
instructed the jury in three ways. First, he contends 
the trial court committed reversible error when it 
failed to instruct the jury on an element of tampering 
with a witness. We agree. 
1f 8 "A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: (a) testify or 
inform falsely; [or] (b) withhold any testimony, 
information, document, or item:...." Utah Code Ann. 
$ 76-8-508(1) (Supp.2001). Because section 76-8-
508 specifies no mens rea for the attempt or 
inducement element, the required mental state is 
governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999). 
That section states, "Every offense not involving 
strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, 
and when the definition of the offense does not 
specify a culpable mental state and the offense does 
not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility." Utah Code Ann. $ 76-2-102 (1999). 
1[ 9 Here, "[t]he trial court gave an elements 
instruction to the jury that closely tracked the 
language of fsection 76-8-508] but omitted the 
language referring to the required mental state. The 
instruction given thus does not specify the culpable 
mental state required for" attempting or inducing a 
person as described in the statute. State v. Chanev. 
1999 UT App 309,<j 53. 989 P.2d 1091 (footnote 
omitted). "To avoid manifest injustice, an elements 
instruction that fails to include the mens rea 
constitutes reversible error." Id. at <[ 54. Thus, as a 
matter of law the trial court's failure to include the 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim 
Pane 2 
mental state required for tampering with a witness is 
manifest injustice. 
1 10 The State argues that because "Defendant 
actually proposed an elements instruction containing 
the very omission he complains of on appeal," he 
invited the trial court's error. [F\2[ The State cites 
Chaney for the proposition that Defendant is thus 
precluded from benefitting by the manifest injustice 
exception; however, Chaney is distinguishable from 
the present case. Although Chaney involved a similar 
fact pattern, we determined that the defendant in that 
case invited the error complained of because he 
objected to and rejected the trial court's correct jury 
instruction and pressed "his theory that the 
accomplice statute requires intent." /rf. at If 55. 
Chaney's conduct led the trial court to commit error. 
See id. at f 1f 54-55. Here, the State has not shown 
that Defendant's conduct actually led the trial court 
into its erroneous action. Thus, the invited error 
doctrine does not apply in this case. See id. at *[ 54 
("[A] party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error." (quoting State v. 
Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107. 1109 (Utah 1996) 
(Emphasis added)). Accordingly, we reverse 
Defendant's conviction for tampering with a witness 
and remand for a new trial on the tampering with a 
witness charge. [FN3] 
FN2. "Where invited error butts up against 
manifest injustice, the invited error rule 
prevails." State v. Purdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 
1206 (Utah Ct.App.1991); accord State v. 
Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, «f 54, 989 P.2d 
1091. 
FN3. In light of this decision, we do not 
address Defendant's challenge based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel to his 
conviction for witness tampenng. 
*3 *[ II Next, Defendant argues the trial court 
improperly instructed the jury regarding the elements 
of making a written false statement. A defendant is 
guilty of making a written false statement if "[w]ith 
intent to deceive a public servant in the performance 
of his official function, he: (a) Makes any written 
false statement which he does not believe to be true: 
or ... (c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing 
which he knows to be lacking in authenticity." Leah 
Code Ann. $ 76-8-504(2) (11999), The trial court's 
• Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
2002 WL 725651 paae J 
2002UTApp 130 
(Cite as: 2002 YVL 725651 (I "tah App, 
elements instruction foi fins offense stales that 
Defendant was guilty of false written statem irnt if 
"intending to deceive a pi lblic servant in the 
performance of his official function [he]; a. 'Made or 
caused to be made a written false statement which 
[he] did not believe to be true; or b. Submitted or 
invited reliance upon a writing which [he] knew to be 
lacking in authenticity." (Emphasis added.) 
% 12 Defendant contends tl le language or caused to 
be made" "impermissibly expands the scope of the 
statute by inferring that [section! 76-8-504(2)(a) 
would include a written false statement of a third 
party which was made at Defendant's request. 
Further, Defendant argues this language creates a 
hybrid between section 76-8-504(2)(a) and section 
76-8-504(2)(c). which invited the jury to substitute 
the "knowing" mental state of section 76-8-504(2)(e) 
with the "believing" mental state of section 76-8-
504(2)(a). The State counters, arguing that because 
the added language "criminalizes no conduct that is 
not already criminalized by subsection (2)(c)," we 
can determine that the jury found all the elements of 
the offense. Thus, the State argues, Defendant cannot 
meet his burden of showing manifest injustice 
because he cannot show the enoi was prejudicial. 
t 13 We agree with the State , \.s applied to 
Defendant, the language "or caused to be made" 
makes illegal no conduct that section 76-8-504(2)(c), 
on which the jury was instructed, did not already 
"criminalize." Put differently, we conclude on the 
facts of this case that if Defendant "caused to be 
made a written false statement which [he] did not 
believe to be true," he necessarily either 
"[s]ubmit[ted] or invitefd] reliance on [a] writing 
which he [knew] to be lacking in authenticity." 
[FN4] Id. In the present case we find little distinction 
between Defendant submitting or inviting reliance on 
a writing which he did "not believe to be true" and 
one "which he knows to be lacking in authenticity." 
Id. "Although the general verdict in this case gave no 
indication of which variation of [making a written 
false statement] the jury relied upon in its conviction, 
the record contains abundant evidence-both 
eyewitness testimony and physical evidence-from 
which the jury could conclude that [Defendant" was 
guilty of making a written false statement. State v. 
Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984). Thus, we 
cannot say Defendant has "demonstrate^] that 
'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for' " Defendant. State v. 
Medina Juarez, 2001 UT 79. <I 18, 34 P.3d 187 
(citation omitted). As a result, Defendant fails to 
demonstrate plain, error :>r manifest inji istice. 
Accordingly, we ,^\, 
court's false statement j u v 
FN4. However, we note that one can meet 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann, j 76-8-
504(2)(c)(T999) other than by causing a 
written false statement to be made as 
described above. 
*4 f 14 Defendant finally argues the trial court 
improperly instructed the jury regarding the elements 
of making a written false statement because it "failed 
to define the mental state of ,know[s]f " contained in 
section 76-8- 5Q4(2)(c). However, he has failed to 
demonstrate prejudice. Whether Defendant "knew" a 
writing lacked authenticity turns on whether he was 
"aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2- 103(2) 
(1999). Defendant fails to demonstrate that an 
instruction defining knowledge in this manner would 
result in " 'a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for' " him. Medina Juarez, 2001 
UT 79 atf 18 (citation omitted). Thus, this challenge 
to the jury instructions also fails. 
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
If 15 Defendant also challenges his conviction for 
making a written false statement based on ineffective 
assistanceof counsel. "[P]roof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter 
1
 u. MUSI oe a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. 
< ooK, .v() P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
n defendant argues that his trial counsel 
ied neifective assistance by failing to object to 
air. :ne of questioning the prosecutor put to 
He .issens the prosecutor's questions to Lyon. 
.my Defendant's knowledge of the 'truthfulness 
.v-mig Defendant requested Lyon to submit, 
ft*c .nonabie under Rule 602 of the Utah Rules 
idi.-ice. 1FN51 Defendant claims he was 
ji idiced because, 
FN5. "A witness may not testify to a matter 
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter." Utah R. 
Evid. 602. 
the jury was allowed to hear and consider without a 
ci ixatn e i nsm iction, a statement attributing a state 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
2002 WL ^25651 p a g e 4 
2002LTApp 130 
(Cite as: 2002 WL 725651 (Utah App.)) 
of mind to defendant, which was supported by no 
other evidence before the court.... No evidence was 
introduced to support a contention to the effect that 
Airman Lvon had any personal knowledge 
whatsoever regarding whether [Defendant] was 
aware Airman Lyon was around when [Defendant] 
allegedly made threatening statements about his 
wife. Nor was there any evidence introduced to .. 
establish the personal knowledge of Airman Lyon 
that Appellant was asking him to "write something 
that was false." 
% 17 However, our review of the record reveals that 
abundant evidence was presented to establish Lyon's 
personal knowledge "regarding whether [Defendant] 
was aware Lyon was around when [Defendant] 
allegedly made threatening statements about his 
wife." Thus, Defendant failed to establish the 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome at 
trial, and thereby failed to establish prejudice. 
Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's conviction for 
making a written false statement. 
CONCLUSION 
% 18 Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury 
on the mental state required for tampering with a 
witness, we reverse his conviction on that charge and 
remand for a new trial on that charge. Otherwise, we 
affirm. 
1 19 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLfNGS, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
DAVIS, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
*5 1| 20 I concur in the majority's analysis of the 
tampering with a witness conviction.. 
1| 21 I do not, however, share the majority's analysis 
or result respecting the written false statement 
conviction. Since the indisputedly erroneous 
instruction added language to the statute that made it 
uniquely applicable to the evidence in this case, 
suggesting that the jury could have found Defendant 
guilty under another section is a stretch that I cannot 
in good conscience make. 
«[ 22 When tailoring a statute to fit the evidence is 
coupled with a failure to define the mental state 
required for conviction. 1 believe the Defendant has 
Copr.© West 2002 No Claim to Ong US Govt Works 
clearly established plain error, and his conviction for 
written false statement should also be reversed 
END OF DOCUMENT 
